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Trade and investment rules:
Latin American perspectives
Pierre Sauvé
This paper depicts the changing international landscape of investment 
rule-making from a Latin American perspective. It does so by looking 
first at the recent evolution of investment rules, pointing out differences 
and synergies between these closely intertwined processes and the role 
that Latin American countries have had in shaping them. Against the 
backdrop of repeated failures to develop a comprehensive set of investment 
disciplines at the multilateral level, the paper reviews the main arguments 
that have been recently advanced in favour of and against global rules for 
investment. The paper dissects the main reasons why investment fell off 
the negotiating agenda of the Doha Development Agenda of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). It concludes with a number of policy lessons 
regarding the most optimal institutional settings in which to pursue various 
elements of investment rule-making and sketches a few forward-looking 
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  This is a revised version of the work contained in Sauvé (2006). 
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not 
necessarily refl ect the views of the Organization.
Investment rules governing cross-border investment 
fl ows usually consist of rules on treatment and protection 
of foreign direct investment (FDI), contributing to what 
is generally referred to as the “investment climate”. 
Investment rules exist at the bilateral, regional and 
multilateral level. The question of how investment 
rules affect investment decisions has long generated 
heated policy debates. In general terms, a stable and 
transparent investment climate can be in the interests 
of investors when they were previously disadvantaged 
by unpredictable investment conditions. It is not clear 
whether this would lead to additional FDI or simply to 
more comfort for the investor. The predictability of the 
investment climate may be enhanced when domestic 
policies are enshrined or locked into international 
treaties. Much will also depend on existing practice. 
If treatment of existing investors is already good in 
practice, new rules will do little by way of generating 
new investment fl ows or a better investment climate, 
other than offering greater long-run security. Empirical 
evidence that addresses the effects of individual 
investment provisions on induced FDI remains scant, 
and results are largely indeterminate.
Against this background, host country governments 
have exhibited differing attitudes towards international 
investment rule-making. Latin American countries are 
probably among those that have shown the greatest 
activism. In the recent past, triggered in particular by 
the debt crisis of the 1980s, Latin American nations 
have recognized the importance of increased foreign 
investment flows into their economies. FDI can, at 
least partly, compensate for sources of capital that 
may otherwise become unavailable from international 
lenders in circumstances of heightened macro-economic 
turmoil. As a result, the region has witnessed a steady 
opening of investment regimes. Alongside domestic (or 
autonomous) investment regime liberalization, Latin 
American countries have engaged in a large number 
of international negotiations. Virtually all of them 
are today World Trade Organization (WTO) members, 
are party to one or more free trade other integration 
agreements, and are signatories of numerous bilateral 
investment treaties.1
This paper depicts the changing international 
landscape of investment rule-making from a Latin 
American perspective. Following the introduction, 
section II reviews the WTO disciplines. Section III 
looks at the scope and content of bilateral and regional 
agreements. Section IV provides an overview of the 
main arguments that have been advanced in favour of 
and against investment rule-making at the multilateral, 
bilateral and regional levels. Section V explores some 
of the reasons that investment fell off the negotiating 
agenda of the Doha Round. Section VI concludes 
by drawing policy lessons and sketches a number of 
forward-looking scenarios on investment rule-making 
at the multilateral level.
I
Introduction
1 Brazil is one exception in this last respect, as it has signed numerous 
bilateral and regional investment treaties and agreements, including 




Multilateral rule-making on investment has a troubled 
history. The investment chapter of the 1948 Havana 
Charter was one of the main reasons for the downfall of 
the proposed International Trade Organization project. 
In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
that survived, no further investment-related negotiations 
took place until the Uruguay Round negotiations in 
the mid-1980s.
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Several other attempts at crafting a global 
investment regime would prove stillborn, including 
most spectacularly the proposed Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI) initiative launched within 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in the late 1990s. The MAI 
represented a major attempt at crafting a multilateral 
(if far from universal) regime for investment.
Finally, and most recently, efforts to include 
investment negotiations proper within the negotiating 
purview of the WTO have proven deeply contentious, 
contributing signifi cantly to the derailing of the December 
2003 ministerial meeting in Cancun. As part of the price 
for imparting forward momentum to the stalled Doha 
Development Agenda, WTO members agreed in July 
2004 that foreign investment would (alongside two other 
so-called “Singapore Issues”, i.e., trade and competition, 
and transparency in government procurement) be taken 
off the WTO negotiating table for the duration of the 
current Doha Development Agenda.
Accordingly, in terms of legally-binding multilateral 
rules, what survives the multiple initiatives of the past 
half-century are the rules that were agreed upon in the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, concluded in 
1994. Of these, the most important elements are the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM), the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
The WTO has produced a rich harvest of investment-
related provisions. This may come as a surprise in light 
of the determined attempt of many GATT members to 
eschew a meaningful discussion of investment matters 
at the outset of the Uruguay Round. That the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the WTO contains so many 
investment-related provisions, most notably in the 
TRIMs Agreement and, particularly in GATS, must be 
ascribed to the rapidly changing policy environment 
within which the Uruguay Round took place.
This fertile environment, characterized by a 
number of far-reaching changes in policy and rule-
making approaches which gained currency in a growing 
number of developed and developing countries, 
was one the multilateral trading system was able to 
internalize (if only partially) by the time the Uruguay 
Round was completed. Among such changes are: (i) a 
growing recognition of the increasingly complementary 
relationship between trade and investment in a 
globalizing world economy; (ii) heightened awareness, 
particularly among developing countries, of the 
policy signalling benefi ts to be derived by credible 
commitments in the areas of trade, investment, 
and intellectual property protection; (iii) a greater 
appreciation of the key contribution of investment as 
the principle means of securing market access and 
enhancing the contestability of markets; and (iv) a 
signifi cant worldwide push towards investment regime 
liberalization, often pursued on a unilateral basis and 
closely tied to efforts aimed at regulatory reform in key 
sectors (including energy, telecommunications, fi nance 
and transportation services).
While the Uruguay Round has set an important 
precedent by laying down markers with which to 
develop more comprehensive rules on investment, the 
limitations of existing provisions must also be borne 
in mind. For one, the TRIMs Agreement remains 
extremely limited in scope and is largely attuned to 
the concerns of an era of policy-making characterized 
more by suspicion of, and need to control, foreign 
investment than by keenness to compete for and 
attract such investment. WTO rules on investment 
remain unbalanced given the asymmetry of disciplines 
applying to performance requirements, the incidence of 
which tends to fall primarily on developing countries, 
as opposed to weak disciplines governing the distortive 
practice of investment incentives, the incidence of which 
tends to be greater among developed countries.
Moreover, while the GATS negotiations have 
brought out quite vividly the central importance of 
investment to trade in services and generated far more 
by way of commercial presence commitments than had 
been expected, their treatment of investment-related 
matters is embodied in provisions that display a number 
of architectural shortcomings. The latter lack defi nitional 
clarity, do not generate adequate transparency; generate 
limited pressures for liberalization; and afford weak 
and only indirect protection to investors.
Much, therefore, remains to be done to equip 
the multilateral trading system with a comprehensive 
panoply of investment disciplines, and it comes as 
no surprise that attempts would be made in the post-
Uruguay Round era to address such shortcomings. Yet, 
despite the continued improvements in host country 
investment climates and policy regimes, attempts at 
crafting a comprehensive set of multilateral disciplines 
on investment have met with very limited success.
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1. Bilateral investment treaties
Starting in the 1960s, bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) have become the most common international 
instrument dealing with investment protection issues. 
The number of such treaties has grown manifold, 
a trend that now engulfs countries at all levels of 
development. The number of signed BITs stands at 
some 2,300, although a smaller number (estimated at 
around 1700) is actually in force. The network of BITs 
grew signifi cantly throughout the 1970s, prompted in 
large measure by a defensive impulse on the part of 
home (i.e., capital-exporting) country governments in 
the wake of the increasing number of expropriations 
and nationalizations, including in Latin America.
The trend accelerated again in the 1990s, albeit 
in a markedly changed policy (and ideological) 
environment, as host country (i.e., capital-importing) 
governments in developing countries and transition 
countries sought to exploit the putative signalling 
properties of BITs. The period saw a signifi cant increase 
in treaties linking a wide range of countries along 
South-North lines, as well as, more recently, along 
South-South lines.
BITs are designed to protect, promote and facilitate 
foreign investment, and they constitute to date the 
most widely used instrument for these purposes. BITs 
have traditionally been negotiated between developing 
countries seeking to attract international investment 
and developed countries as the principal homes to 
foreign investors.
The content of BITs has become increasingly 
standardized over the years and has largely infl uenced 
rule-making at the regional level, particularly during 
the last fi fteen years, though, as a consequence of the 
growth in the sheer number of BITs, the formulation 
of individual provisions remains rather varied.
There are notable differences between the provisions 
of BITs signed some decades ago and the more recent 
ones. A typical treaty’s main provisions deal with the 
scope and defi nition of foreign investment; admission 
of investments; national and most-favoured-nation 
treatment; fair and equitable treatment; guarantees and 
compensation in respect of expropriation; guarantees 
of free transfer of funds and repatriation of capital and 
profi ts; and dispute-settlement provisions, both State-
to-State and investor-to-State. The acceptability of 
investor-State arbitration was signifi cantly advanced by 
the conclusion in 1965 of the Washington Convention, 
overturning the practice of sovereign immunity long 
embedded in the Calvo doctrine.
As noted earlier, perhaps the most relevant new 
development in international practice of the last few 
years is the frequency with which developing countries 
and countries in transition are concluding agreements 
with each other. In content terms, it bears noting that 
South-South practice does not depart signifi cantly from 
the content of BITs concluded along North-South lines.
BITs remain primarily, if not exclusively, investment 
protection instruments. Over the years there has 
not been any signifi cant change from their original 
objectives. It is thus still true that “a striking feature of 
BITs is the multiplicity of provisions they contain that 
are specifi cally designed to protect foreign investments, 
and the absence of provisions specifi cally designed to 
ensure economic growth and development” (Zampetti 
and Fredriksson, 2003).
2. Investment rules in regional 
 integration agreements
The universe of regional instruments on investment 
does not reach the magnitude of the BIT phenomenon, 
but is still vast, diverse and growing. As such, regional 
agreements have also begun to create an intricate web 
of overlapping commitments. While BITs have a distinct 
focus on investment protection, regional integration 
agreements (RIAs), and interregional ones, are often 
geared towards investment regime liberalization even 
though many of them also address investment protection 
issues. In the case of European Union RIAs the focus 
on liberalization is particularly pronounced, as core 
investment protection issues are not within European 
Union competence and are generally addressed in BITs 
concluded by individual member States.
At the regional level, only a few instruments are 
entirely devoted to investment, such as the Andean 
Community’s Decision 291 (adopted in 1991). However, 
III
Scope and content of bilateral 
and regional agreements
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a growing number of regional trade agreements have in 
recent years embedded what are often comprehensive 
disciplines on investment. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and MERCOSUR Protocols 
are examples of this trend, albeit less comprehensively 
and still subject to ratifi cation shortcomings.
The general aim of these agreements is to 
create a more favourable investment climate through 
liberalization measures, with a view to increasing the 
fl ow of investment within or between regions. As a 
result, the commonality of substantive rules is much 
less marked than in the case of BITs.
Latin American countries have been among the 
most active in pursuing such regional trade agreements, 
which, since NAFTA, typically include investment 
rules geared towards the twin pursuits of investment 
protection and liberalization.
Until recently, the United States and the European 
Union represented the region’s most important partners, 
as hubs. However, there is now growing interest in 
Asia. In 2004, Mexico concluded the fi rst free trade 
agreement (FTA) between Japan and a Latin American 
country.2 Chile and China have just completed talks 
on an FTA; Panama has entered into an agreement 
with Taiwan Province of China; and China, Japan and 
the Republic of Korea are actively considering new 
integration agreements or other means of enhanced 
economic cooperation, including in the investment 
fi eld, with Latin American partners.
3. Bilateral and regional advances in 
investment rule-making
Prior to the 1990s, relatively few investment-related 
provisions appeared in RIAs. Most such provisions were 
intended to protect property and were found in BITs. 
Investment-related provisions now commonly appear 
in RIAs in every region of the world and especially 
in those involving Latin American countries. Prior 
to the 1990s, and unlike BITs, which had historically 
tended to associate countries at very different levels 
of development, such as advanced capital-exporting 
nations and poorer host countries, RIAs were negotiated 
principally among States within the same region and 
at similar stages of economic development. RIAs now 
commonly link States in different regions of the world 
and often seek to integrate economies at very different 
stages of development.
The number of RIAs with investment-related 
provisions has increased dramatically since the 1990s. 
Although interregional agreements are becoming more 
common, the majority of RIAs that have been concluded 
by States in the Americas are with other States in 
the region. A large number of those States are party 
to at least one RIA, typically modelled after NAFTA. 
The CARICOM States, however, have not generally 
concluded RIAs outside of CARICOM.
Many investment-related provisions in RIAs 
address the same issues as their counterpart provisions 
in BITs and relate to compensation for expropriation and 
guaranteeing freedom of transfers. Although investment 
protection provisions in RIAs are often similar to those 
found in BITs, there appears to be greater substantive 
variance in the content of provisions between RIAs. 
One explanation may be that most countries, such as 
the United States, use a model negotiating text for 
their BITs, which tends to create uniformity across 
bilateral treaties. The participation of a greater number 
of States in the negotiation of a number of plurilateral 
RIAs, and the need to accommodate differing levels 
of commitment towards investment liberalization, has 
tended to require greater flexibility and thus more 
creativity in the drafting of legal provisions.
It remains true, however, that RIAs have in large 
measure codifi ed pre-existing BIT practice in respect 
of investment protection issues. This is true even 
though RIAs have most recently been used to correct 
some of the perceived shortcomings of traditional BIT 
provisions, notably regarding investor-State arbitration 
over matters of indirect expropriation. In so doing, RIAs 
can arguably be said to fulfi l their role as laboratories 
for experimenting (notably in light of evolving 
jurisprudence) with a number of rule-making advances 
that have proved to be obstacles to previous attempts 
at crafting multilateral investment disciplines, notably 
under the proposed OECD multilateral agreement on 
investment. Such advances, and the testing grounds that 
RIAs afford them, could facilitate the future adoption of 
similar multilateral disciplines in a WTO context.
The commonly found provisions in RIAs that 
go beyond traditional BITs are those that prohibit 
anticompetitive business practices, protect intellectual 
property rights, liberalize admission procedures and 
2 See the “Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States 
for the strengthening of the Economic Partnership”. The purposes 
of the Agreement are to promote freer cross-border fl ow of goods, 
persons, services and capital between Japan and Mexico. It also aims 
to promote a comprehensive economic partnership, which includes 
competition, improvement of business environment and bilateral 
cooperation in such fi elds as vocational education and training and 
support for small and medium-sized enterprises.
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open up trade and investment in services, including in 
the form of commercial presence, which is akin to FDI. 
As in the case of BITs, issues related to taxation and 
investment incentives are generally absent from RIAs.
RIAs in the Americas have been heavily infl uenced 
by NAFTA, which contains an investment chapter 
modelled after the provisions of the BITs of the United 
States, though more elaborate in some respects. The 
same can also be said of the Mexico-Japan Economic 
Partnership Agreement. European RIAs, including those 
with Latin American partners, are chiefl y concerned 
with liberalization (post-agreement market access), 
limiting anticompetitive practices, and protecting 
intellectual property. The European approach leaves 
investment protection to BITs concluded by European 
Union member States. Accordingly, RIAs involving 
the European Union, including those agreed with 
Latin American countries, do not feature provisions 
on investor-State dispute settlement.
The fact that RIAs tend to contain greater variation 
in legal provisions than is the case of BITs does not 
mean that RIAs are necessarily weaker agreements. 
Indeed, RIAs demonstrate that it is possible to achieve 
high-standard agreements outside the context of a BIT. 
Though it remains true that the strongest agreements 
tend to be bilateral in nature (reflecting in many 
instances power asymmetries between signatories), 
RIAs binding on multiple States and providing for high 
standards of investment protection and liberalization 
have been successfully concluded.
RIAs also tend to feature a larger number of 
provisions that take account of the special circumstances 
of developing countries than is the case under BITs. This 
is to be expected to some extent, given that some RIAs 
have only developing countries as parties. Finally, and 
as noted above, whether limited to developing countries 
or including countries at different stages of economic 
development, RIAs appear to offer greater scope than 
BITs for experimenting with different approaches to 
promoting international investment fl ows.
IV
Main arguments in investment rule-making 
debates: Bilateral, regional or 
multilateral approaches
The advantages and disadvantages of international 
investment agreements differ depending on whether 
such agreements are bilateral, regional or multilateral 
in scope. Advantages and disadvantages can also be 
viewed from different perspectives, such as those 
of the host versus home countries, and specifi cally 
with regard to the issues covered, the inclusion of 
development-related provisions, impacts on the 
regulatory sovereignty of host States, the impact on 
FDI fl ows, and relative bargaining power.
One of the main reasons for the popularity of BITs 
is the fact that they provide fl exibility to the host country, 
affording it the possibility of screening and channelling 
FDI (as admission is generally subject to the domestic 
laws of the host country), while at the same time 
extending the necessary protection to foreign investors. 
However, BITs often involve countries at different 
levels of development, with unequal bargaining power 
and negotiating capabilities. Furthermore, available 
empirical evidence does not suggest a signifi cant impact 
of BITs on investment fl ows.
Finally, investor-to-State dispute settlement 
mechanisms, which complement investment protection 
provisions, may give rise to high costs and liabilities for 
developing countries in addition to raising potentially 
controversial issues relating to the right to regulate in the 
public interest. The recent spate of litigation involving 
Argentina is an obvious case in point, as is the more 
general trend of heightened judicial activity observed 
since the late 1990s under BIT and RIA treaties.
At the regional level, while investment protection 
issues are often addressed, international investment 
agreements tend to have a broader focus, which 
includes the liberalization of restrictions to entry and 
establishment of FDI, followed by the reduction of 
discriminatory operational (post-entry) restrictions. 
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These elements are generally part of wide-ranging 
agreements addressing a host of other policy areas, 
from trade liberalization for both goods and services 
to intellectual property protection. As such, regional 
integration agreements may provide signatories with 
more space for trade-offs. However, the broader focus 
of these agreements, coupled with recourse to investor-
to-State dispute settlement mechanisms, means that, 
like BITs, they are hardly immune from potential 
public policy controversies relating to investor-State 
arbitration, as experience under NAFTA has shown, 
notably in respect of litigation relating to the alleged 
confiscatory effects (e.g. indirect expropriation) of 
environmental or health regulations.
Even to a larger extent than BITs, regional 
instruments use all the panoply of traditional international 
law tools, such as exceptions, reservations, transition 
periods and the like, to ensure fl exibility in obligations 
so as to cater to the different needs and capacities of 
parties at different levels of development. From the 
perspective of developing countries this, together with 
the growing recognition of the links between trade and 
investment fl ows, may explain why investment rules are 
increasingly found in RIAs, which had initially been 
concerned primarily with trade issues.
As RIAs addressing investment issues and BITs 
have multiplied in number, they have also created 
an intricate web of overlapping commitments. This 
is one of the main arguments cited in favour of 
creating a common, multilaterally-agreed, framework 
for investment that, in the words of the WTO Doha 
Ministerial declaration, would “secure transparent, 
stable and predictable conditions for long-term 
cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct 
investment” (WTO, 2001).
Proponents of a unifi ed WTO compact on investment 
have argued that a new multilateral framework of rules 
could ensure autonomous as well as bilaterally- and 
regionally-negotiated liberalization and extend the 
benefi ts of such openness on a most favoured nation 
(MFN) basis, preventing possible policy reversals where 
liberalization measures have yet to be consolidated.
The counter-argument that has been voiced recalls 
that a multilayered set of investment rules already exists 
under BITs and regional instruments, and also at the 
multilateral level, especially under the WTO Agreement 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (the “TRIMs 
Agreement”) and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).
Existing rules may be far from perfect, but it has 
generally proven diffi cult for the “friends” of investment 
at the WTO to advance proposals suggesting that a clearly 
superior set of rules could be agreed upon in a WTO 
framework. Furthermore, the complexity of overlapping 
investment rules and regulations will likely persist, 
unless BITs and investment rules in regional instruments 
are superseded by a multilateral agreement.
At the same time, it remains the case that in the 
current WTO system an imbalance exists between the 
treatment enjoyed by investors in service sectors, which 
is already covered to some extent by GATS rules, and 
treatment enjoyed by all other investors, to which only 
the TRIMs Agreement may be deemed to apply in a 
direct manner.
From a development perspective, the question 
of the appropriate rule-making ‘level’ —bilateral, 
regional or multilateral— cannot be separated from 
an examination of the actual or potential content of 
investment rules and commitments. All international 
investment agreements are instruments of cooperation 
between countries that are entered into voluntarily. 
Furthermore, like all treaties, international investment 
agreements as such are neutral instruments: what 
determines their impact on the development prospects 
or regulatory sovereignty of countries is their content, 
and so far the development-specifi c content of such 
agreements at all levels has been rather modest. There 
is, accordingly, considerable scope for increasing the 
attention paid to development issues in international 
rule-making on investment.
This is particularly true in light of the power 
and negotiating capacity asymmetries that typically 
characterize multi-issue negotiations where a single 
undertaking prevails at the end and where great care needs 
to be exercised in ensuring that the interests of developing 
countries are properly addressed or preserved.
At the same time, negotiations at the multilateral 
level offer developing countries greater leverage than 
do regional or bilateral negotiations, since they are 
able to advance common ideas on substantive issues 
of importance to them. Moreover, the multilateral 
level could allow all developing countries, if adequate 
capacity-building efforts were put in place, to 
meaningfully participate in the design of new rules, 
which are otherwise going to be increasingly shaped 
by a restricted number of key countries participating 
in bilateral or regional initiatives.
In this regard, it is important that all international 
investment agreements are shaped so as to allow enough 
policy autonomy and fl exibility. More specifi cally, the 
legal obligations entered into should not unduly limit 
the sovereign right to regulate in the public interest. 
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RIAs (more than BITs) have in recent years gone some 
way towards clarifying (and generally circumscribing 
the scope of) a number of investment protection-related 
provisions that could be deemed to unduly impair the 
regulatory autonomy of host States.
The quest for policy autonomy on the part of 
developing countries extends beyond protection matters 
to issues of admission and treatment, including support 
(subsidies and incentives) for domestic industries 
and performance requirements. While there seems 
to be an unambiguous collective preference for 
regulatory inaction on the issue of investment-related 
subsidies (i.e. investment incentives), the question of 
discipline on performance requirements has revealed 
an interesting paradox. Though the latter featured 
prominently in the Uruguay Round’s implementation 
debate (as did the widespread perception of the Round’s 
inequitable treatment of developing countries), it has 
generated little resistance in the context of RIAs, the 
great majority of which proscribe a more exhaustive 
list of measures than that mentioned in the TRIMs 
Agreement.
V
Anatomy of failure: investment and the Doha 
development agenda 
At the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in 
Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, WTO members agreed 
to launch negotiations on foreign investment after the 
fi fth session of the Ministerial Conference “on the basis 
of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that 
Session on modalities of negotiations” (WTO, 2001). 
The decision identifi ed a number of subjects that would 
be the focus of further work in the Working Group on 
the Relationship between Trade and Investment (WGTI) 
until the fifth Ministerial Conference and defined 
certain basic considerations that would need to be 
taken into account in negotiations on the envisaged 
multilateral framework.
While the work of the WGTI is widely seen to 
have been highly pedagogical in character and resulted 
in an unprecedented level of technical assistance and 
capacity-building being directed towards the investment 
policy fi eld, it also proved highly contentious. Indeed, of 
the four “Singapore Issues” discussed by WTO members 
since 1996 (investment, trade and competition, 
trade facilitation and transparency in government 
procurement), investment was the subject matter most 
centrally involved in derailing the September 2003 WTO 
Ministerial Meeting held in Cancun.
The impasse surrounding investment and its 
treatment in the WTO system was ultimately resolved 
by the WTO General Council’s July 2004 decision to 
confi ne Singapore Issue discussions under the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) solely to the subject of 
trade facilitation. The most immediate fallout from 
the failed WTO initiative will be to shift the focus of 
key rule-making initiatives on investment back to the 
bilateral and regional levels. These will take the form of 
BITs or RIAs featuring the extensive array of investment 
protection and liberalization provisions reviewed in 
this paper. For countries in the Americas, this entails 
essentially bilateral agreements insofar as prospects 
for a hemispheric integration agreement, such as the 
proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), no 
longer seem to hold the promise they once did.
Progress on making investment rules may well be 
more feasible at the bilateral and regional levels. This 
is so for at least two important reasons: fi rst, the fact 
that such negotiations, particularly bilateral ones, are 
characterized by signifi cant asymmetries of economic 
and political power between capital-exporting and 
capital-importing countries. A second reason is that 
BITs and RIAs typically start with a blank page and 
do not confront the delicate task of reopening existing 
rules, commitments and the balance of concessions 
that would inevitably complicate any attempt at fi tting 
new investment rules alongside existing ones in the 
WTO context.
Discussions on investment at the WTO have 
highlighted a strange paradox: fi erce resistance at the 
multilateral level by a number of developing countries 
on a subject towards which their unilateral, bilateral 
or regional policy stances have been starkly different 
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(and considerably more accommodating). Indeed, 
the burgeoning network of treaties, principally at the 
bilateral level, refl ects a growing willingness and ability 
on the part of developing countries to codify existing 
legal frameworks for international investment at the 
country level, in part because of the strongly unilateral 
character of recent liberalization decisions.
The failure of WTO members to reach agreement 
on negotiating modalities for investment under the DDA 
must be assessed against the backdrop of the value 
added, coherence and negotiating incentives implicit in 
the proposals of its WTO advocates as opposed to the 
respective merits of BITs and RIAs. To put it simply, 
what purpose should a multilateral set of investment 
rules serve? Should, and can, it aim to go beyond what 
already exists at the bilateral and regional levels? And 
is such a body of rules worth having (and “paying 
for” in negotiating terms) if its content proves to be 
less than a BIT or RIA, as seems most likely given the 
considerably greater economic and political diversity 
of WTO membership and the recent reassertion by 
many developing countries of the need for greater 
policy space?3
On all the above grounds, and as the July 
2004 decision of the WTO General Council recently 
confi rmed, what was on offer in the investment area 
oddly failed to garner widespread support among WTO 
members. Such a conclusion can be reached when one 
looks at DDA proposals on investment through the prism 
of the four core components of investment rule-making: 
(1) protection; (2) liberalization; (3) distortions; and 
(4) good governance.
1. Investment protection
The WTO is arguably not the optimal setting in which 
to tackle matters of investment protection. WTO 
members appear to concur with this viewpoint to the 
extent that the issue of investment protection has never 
been a core agenda item in WGTI discussions. One 
major reason for this is that one of the distinguishing 
features of BITs or RIAs featuring comprehensive 
investment disciplines (recourse to investor-State 
dispute settlement procedures, to which investors 
naturally attach considerable importance) is for all 
intents and purposes not conceivable in a WTO setting. 
Indeed, the precedent —both legal and, perhaps more 
importantly, political— that such an instrument would 
create would likely fuel strong demands for private 
party recourse to dispute settlement in areas outside of 
investment, such as the environment, labour and human 
rights. This is something the diverse and polarized WTO 
membership appears most unlikely to support.
2. Investment liberalization
The WTO is on decidedly fi rmer ground as regards the 
core investment liberalization agenda. However, here 
again, one needs to consider two important facts to 
which proponents of a WTO agreement appear to have 
paid insuffi cient attention. First is the fact that some 
two-thirds of aggregate annual FDI fl ows are today 
directed towards service industries. Second, and perhaps 
more important from the perspective of the value added 
of any new WTO investment rule-making initiative, is 
that some four fi fths of impediments to cross-border 
FDI are also found in service industries.
The predominance of services as the principal 
locus of investment restrictions, and thus of investment 
regime liberalization, stands out vividly, with the share 
of non-conforming measures in services ranging from 
76.9 percent in the case of Canada and the United 
States, to 81.6 per cent in the study’s Latin American 
sample countries (Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Mexico), with a 
high of 94.1 percent in the case of transition economies 
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
3. Investment distortions
As regards collective action responses to investment-
distorting measures, which tend to affect FDI in 
manufacturing more than in services, it is important 
to distinguish three sub-categories of policy measures. 
A fi rst category consists of performance requirements, 
for which a comprehensive ban already exists under 
the “TRIMs Agreement” and whose scope arguably 
exceeds the limited subset of measures depicted in 
the agreement’s illustrative list of prohibited measures. 
The main challenge in a multilateral context would be 
to incorporate the “TRIMs Agreement” by reference in 
any new WTO investment instrument and to consider 
its possible extension to investment in services, 
something a number of RIAs have done. As noted 
earlier, given the salience of the TRIMs Agreement in 
3 As noted above, the quest for policy space in the investment fi eld 
is itself paradoxical as it has arisen mostly in the context of WTO 
negotiations and against the backdrop of the implementation debate 
burden fl owing from the Uruguay Round. Meanwhile, developing 
countries would appear to have been willingly ceding policy space 
under BITs (a growing number of which are concluded among 
themselves) and RIAs.
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the contentious WTO debate over the implementation 
burdens fl owing from Uruguay Round agreements, 
such expanded scope cannot be taken for granted, 
even as recent research has begun to document the 
prevalence of TRIM-like measures in services (Sauvé, 
Molinuevo and Tuerk, 2006).
A second core element of the distortion agenda 
relates to investment incentives, which have been in use 
increasingly in recent years in all regions of the world 
and now in a growing number of developing countries. 
However desirable, not least on equity and coherence 
grounds, the coverage of investment incentives —the 
granting of which are often closely related to the 
imposition of performance requirements— would likely 
prove daunting in a WTO context if one is to judge by 
past failures and the revealed policy preference of host 
country governments for legal inaction in this area.
What is more, the question arises of the most 
appropriate level at which to tackle such sources of 
distortions (such as regional or multilateral agreements), 
given the likely greater regional incidence of locational 
competition between host countries. There has indeed 
been intense competition among developed and 
developing countries (but signifi cantly less so between 
the two groups) in trying to attract FDI by using 
investment incentives. Central governments —and 
subnational ones in federal countries— make great use of 
these instruments, particularly in developed countries.
A third cluster of distortion-related challenges 
relates not so much to investment measures but to trade 
policy measures, and involves a range of practices that 
distort investment decisions away from the equilibrium 
that would prevail in their absence. Perhaps the best 
example of such investment-related trade measures 
is the discriminatory, sector-specifi c rules of origin 
found in many free trade agreements. Many such 
rules targeted Japanese investors in the past, notably 
in the automobile sector, with signifi cant trade- and 
investment-distorting consequences. Such measures 
are also prevalent in the textiles and clothing sector, 
and indeed in many host-country sectors fearful of 
delocalization and structural competitive weaknesses 
in domestic industries.4
4. Good governance
Of all the issues linked to what one might call the 
“good governance” agenda in the investment fi eld, those 
relating to transparency are arguably the only ones that 
could reasonably easily be anchored within a WTO 
investment agreement. Here again, however, one would 
need to refl ect on the implications for effectiveness and 
development of recourse to dispute settlement and the 
attendant threat of trade or investment sanctions as a 
means of enforcing such positive prescriptions.
For all other issues relating to good governance 
—spanning subjects as diverse as the fight against 
corruption, the promotion of home country measures, 
the advancement of corporate social responsibility, 
and best practices in investment promotion— legally 
binding and enforceable legal responses, a fortiori in 
the WTO, appear ill-suited to the task and unlikely 
to command much support from the investment 
community.
4 Other signifi cant IRTMs include tariff peaks and tariff escalation, 
as well the anticompetitive practices made possible under national 
anti-dumping regimes.
VI
Conclusion: advancing forward-looking scenarios 
on investment
The quest for a global, multilateral, WTO-anchored, 
agreement will nonetheless likely be kept in mind and 
infl uence the actions of those countries that continue 
to believe in the desirability of such a rule-making 
approach. Without prejudging what the future might 
hold, this paper concludes with a few possible forward-
looking scenarios. As it happens, several of the policy 
interrogations that will determine the fi nal shape and 
content of a possible future WTO multilateral framework 
on investment (MFI) are questions that WTO members 
can also refl ect upon and address in the context of their 
ongoing BIT and, especially, ria negotiations.
Should WTO members one day decide to take up 
negotiations towards a comprehensive agreement on 
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investment, they would need to determine the scope 
of that agreement and to address a number of core 
components. The substantive scope consists of the 
disciplines of the agreement, including the defi nition 
of key terms such as investments and investors (that 
is, in which investments and investors would benefi t 
from the agreement). Countries would need to assess 
the impact of these defi nitions on the provisions of 
the agreement and an eventual liberalization process. 
Should the def inition of investment include FDI, 
portfolio investment, real estate and intangible assets? 
Should it be broad enough to allow for the inclusion 
of new forms of investment, while providing for the 
defi nition of what is not an investment (in order to 
exclude short-term capital fl ows)? Should it extend to 
the pre- and post-establishment phase of an investment 
or could disciplines follow a variable geometry 
approach, with a broader def inition applying to 
investment protection matters and a more circumscribed 
definition (for instance, limited to FDI flows only) 
adopted for purposes of investment liberalization?
Should an eventual investment agreement also 
apply to commitments made under the GATS in 
regard to commercial presence and under the “TRIMs 
Agreement” in respect of performance requirements? 
While the defi nition of commercial presence under 
article XXVIII of GATS is narrower than that typically 
found in BITs or in RIAs featuring comprehensive 
investment disciplines, it does cover pre- and post-
establishment investment issues.
Basic provisions on national treatment and MFN 
are another key element of any prospective multilateral 
agreement on investment. WTO members would need to 
decide whether to apply the MFN and national treatment 
provisions across the board to all members and sectors 
(subject to negative list reservations), or to adopt the 
GATS approach, that is, to have an all-encompassing 
MFN provision with temporary exemptions and a 
conditional national treatment and market access 
standard, which would apply only to sectors and sub-
sectors in which members would voluntarily schedule 
commitments. The choice of negative or hybrid list 
approaches to liberalization can have far-reaching 
implications for future regulatory conduct and the 
attractiveness of investment rules for many developing-
country governments.
WTO members would thus need to assess whether 
a WTO Agreement on Investment would include 
commitments to investment liberalization in both 
goods and services, raising complex questions of an 
architectural overhaul and the treatment of acquired 
rights (and the attendant balance of benefi ts) fl owing 
from current agreements.
Another relevant question (including at the 
bilateral and regional level) is whether the liberalization 
commitments made by WTO members should refl ect the 
regulatory status quo. Securing such an outcome would 
entail a potentially signifi cant departure from a long-
standing tradition in goods trade under the GATT (for 
tariff negotiations) that was extended to services under 
the GATS in the Uruguay Round, whereby countries 
have traditionally maintained (and exercised) the right 
to bind less than the status quo.
Any comprehensive investment agreement 
would also need to address the issue of performance 
requirements, resulting most likely in the incorporation 
by reference of disciplines found under the “TRIMs 
Agreement”. The question of whether such disciplines 
should be extended to services would need to be 
addressed, and would no doubt prove contentious given 
the recent focus on preserving policy space and the 
fact that service industries are still nascent in many 
developing countries.
However desirable, not least on equity and 
coherence grounds, disciplines on the granting 
of investment incentives would likely prove more 
contentious in a WTO setting if one is to judge by past 
failures and revealed policy preferences in this area. 
As noted earlier, provisions on investment incentives 
could nonetheless address issues related to their scope, 
codifi cation, and the prohibition of (or encouragement 
to refrain from) some types of incentives. The principles 
of transparency and non-discrimination (national 
treatment and MFN treatment) should ideally apply 
to such practices, though progress is likely to prove 
difficult for obvious political reasons in important 
host countries.
An alternative scenario would be to expand the 
current WTO investment framework without negotiating 
a comprehensive agreement on investment. Several 
options are possible in this regard. Given that the bulk 
of investment restrictions arise in service sectors, WTO 
members could focus on investment liberalization in the 
GATS and ensure that commitments refl ect more closely 
the investment regime in place in each member country 
(that is, encourage or mandate the scheduling of status 
quo commitments for mode 3 trade).5 The latter issue 
5 The WTO defi nes a number of modalities for the provision of 
services in international trade. These include Mode 1, cross-border 
trade, where the service provider crosses the border in order to 
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is one that WTO members could require or encourage 
their BIT or RIA partners to uphold in agreements where 
a GATS-like, hybrid, approach to scheduling is adopted. 
Recent examples include RIAs signed by Japan with a 
number of countries in south-east Asia.6
WTO members could also elect to develop 
complementary disciplines on investment in goods, 
to address the market access component of an 
investment agreement that is currently missing under 
existing WTO disciplines. This was essentially what 
proponents of investment in the Doha Round had 
been arguing for, with decidedly poor results. Such 
an approach would need to be complemented by 
efforts at extending to services the disciplines found 
under the “TRIMs Agreement”, another arduous task 
given the prominence of the post-Uruguay Round 
“TRIMs Agreement” implementation debate in WTO. 
As well, more explicit multilateral disciplines on 
investment incentives promoting transparency (and 
possibly non-discrimination, including on a voluntary, 
but MFN, basis) could be added to the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and once more 
possibly extended, in whole or in part, to investment 
in services.
Another scenario would be for WTO members 
to negotiate a multilateral agreement on investment, 
which would be comprehensive in nature, covering both 
investment protection and liberalization, and whose 
benefi ts would either extend solely to signatories or 
be concluded and applied on an MFN basis once an 
acceptable critical mass of cross-border investment 
activity had been met (as is the case of the WTO 
Information Technology Agreement). The European 
Commission fl oated the idea of a plurilateral approach 
for a short while in December 2000, but there were 
generally few takers, as the establishment of new 
plurilateral disciplines under the WTO requires the 
explicit consensus of all member countries, a situation 
that never prevailed on the Singapore Issues in general 
and on investment matters in particular.
A final forward-looking scenario, which WTO 
members can also seek to pursue at the bilateral and 
regional levels, would involve a negotiating quid pro 
quo to be envisaged as linking the movement of capital 
(investment) to that of labour (people). 
Such a factor-movement-based negotiating bargain 
would respond to a thematic area —the temporary 
mobility of skilled and semi-skilled workers— that 
is high on the list of export priorities of a large (and 
growing) number of developing countries. Worker 
remittances are, after FDI, the second largest source 
of external fi nance in developing countries, and such 
fl ows dwarf FDI in many of them, particularly poorer 
ones that tend to attract little by way of FDI infl ows. 
Furthermore, a capital-labour quid pro quo would also 
address the paucity of qualifi ed workers that is becoming 
acute in a number of ageing societies. This challenge 
is particularly important in the case of developed 
countries, given prevailing demographic trends.
There is little doubt that the politics of labour 
movement are harder to contend with than those relating 
to capital mobility, a reality that is equally prevalent in 
developing countries. Still, despite these challenges and 
the genuine public policy concerns they give rise to, 
scope exists for countries to explore in an imaginative 
way the factor mobility linkages that could be exploited 
in RIAs (today) and the WTO (tomorrow).
For this to occur, WTO members could mould 
their RIAs on the tripartite architecture fi rst used in 
NAFTA and found in a number of subsequent RIAs 
(particularly prominent in Latin America) that feature 
a complementary set of disciplines on: (i) cross-border 
trade in services (modes 1 and 2 of GATS); (ii) generic 
(horizontal) disciplines on investment applicable to 
goods and services in an undifferentiated manner; 
and (iii) generic disciplines on the temporary entry of 
business people.
Pursuing a capital-labour mobility agenda is 
arguably easier to contemplate at the bilateral and 
regional level than in a WTO setting, as negotiators 
in Geneva would inevitably need to contend with 
fi tting any new investment disciplines into existing 
agreements, reopen the delicate balance of concessions 
embedded in them and possibly review the architecture 
of the WTO family of agreements. This is most clearly 
the case of the GATS, whose scope would need to be 
reduced to dealing exclusively with cross-border trade 
in services (modes 1 and 2) in order for new horizontal 
agreements to be pursued in the areas of investment 
(in goods and services) and the movement of people 
(across all sectors).
provide it. In Mode 2 it is the service consumer who crosses the 
border. Mode 3 involves a permanent commercial presence of the 
service supplier by means of an investment, and Mode 4 involves 
transitory migration by natural persons working in a service enterprise 
in one country in order to provide the service in another.
6 Recent Japanese FTAs feature a dual innovation: (i) an obligation 
to bind the regulatory status quo in investment commitments 
while keeping with a GATS-type voluntary approach to scheduling 
sectors in which commitments are made; and (ii) the publication 
for transparency purposes of non-binding lists of non-conforming 
measures affecting trade and investment in services.
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As this paper has tried to show, the reasons for the 
current impasse on investment at the WTO are numerous. 
They involve a complex interplay of procedural, tactical 
and substantive concerns and involve a paradoxical quest 
for policy space in multilateral discussions at the same 
time that such space continues to be ceded in the context 
of unilateral, bilateral or regional policy initiatives.
That impasse provides a good opportunity for a 
thorough and much-needed rethinking of the objectives 
that negotiations on investment should pursue, 
including, at the regional and bilateral levels, the value 
added that any renewed attempt at placing investment 
on the WTO agenda can hope to achieve, and the 
parameters within which such discussions should be 
conducted if they are to balance the interests of home 
and host countries alike.
(Original: English)
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